Map Vigil to your regulated vertical — finance, healthcare, government.
Agent runtimes are now sitting inside production systems that regulators, auditors, and risk committees already own — trading desks, EHR pipelines, mission-system workflows. The agent-runtime risks are not the same in every vertical: data exfiltration to RAG sources in financial services looks different from PHI exposure in healthcare looks different from supply-chain risk in government. Each section below names the agent-runtime risks most relevant to that vertical, the deployment model Vigil supports today, and the relevant compliance posture — and points at the run-time detection signals that evidence the coverage.
Trading desks, advisor agents, and retail-banking copilots run on a runtime the regulator didn't sign off on.
Financial-services agent runtimes touch customer positions, trader notes, and payments rails — the same data the SOC 2 audit, the OCC examiner, and the broker-dealer risk committee are named against. Vigil's pattern-weight framework is wired to score the three agent-runtime risk families this vertical sees most often, in the same run-time path as the live detection tester.
Data exfiltration to RAG sources
A poisoned document in the RAG corpus — a tampered S-1 PDF, a manipulated analyst note — is read by the internal-knowledge agent that handles trader research or advisor briefings, and content drawn from a customer position file is silently exfiltrated into model responses or tool calls. Vigil flags adversarial instructions embedded in retrieved context before they enter the response surface, and the score lands in the same alert_signals row used by the text-channel detector.
Tool-chain abuse against payments and core-banking APIs
An agent composes a sequence of tools — an ACH transfer tool, a wire tool, a balance-check tool — so each individual call sits inside an approved scope but the composed sequence is a privilege laundering. Classic confused-deputy shape across tool providers; the runtime is the only place it can be detected because each tool sees only its own authenticated call.
Cross-session memory poisoning in long-running advisor agents
Adversarial entries written into shared, vector, or persistent memory by one session resurface as authoritative context to a future session that has no reason to suspect them. In advisor agents that persist across many customer interactions, persistent memory is the foothold and the retrieval step is the trigger — the same family tracked under memory poisoning across sessions in the cross-agent taxonomy.
Deployment model. Vigil ships as cloud / SaaS today — instrument the runtime, send tool-call events and prompt traces to the Vigil pipeline, and surface everything through the detection console and the audit trail. Roadmap On-prem and customer-VPC deployment are next on the path so regulated buyers can keep agent telemetry inside their own perimeter; contact us to scope a deployment against your data-residency requirements.
Compliance posture. SOC 2 is the current scope, with auditor-grade handover through the action_logs table — every tool call, every permitted / blocked / warned disposition, every alert signal that triggered the block, retained as a queryable timeline. The signal pipeline rows in alert_signals form the evidence trail a SOC 2 control review or an examiner walkthrough can pull on demand.
PHI sits in the agent's retrieval context, input bytes, and tool results — and HIPAA covers all three.
Healthcare agent runtimes read clinical documents, query EHR systems, and process imaging — each one a different vector for protected health information to leave the authorized boundary. Vigil scores the three agent-runtime risk families this vertical faces most often against the same run-time detection pipeline used for text and image prompt injection, so a vision-channel attack and a clinical-document exfiltration event surface in the same operator workflow.
PHI exposure via indirect prompt injection in clinical-document RAG
Adversarial instructions embedded in a clinical document — a discharge summary, a lab report, an imaging-study note — get retrieved by the agent and treated as authoritative context. PHI travels along the same channel as the injection, so what begins as a retrieval-poisoning incident becomes a documented PHI disclosure event in an audit. Vigil flags instruction-shaped strings inside retrieved documents before they reach the response.
Tool-result injection in EHR connector agents (FHIR / HL7)
Adversarial content planted in the return value of a clinical-system tool — a tampered FHIR read, an HL7 message with embedded instructions, a poisoned lab-result fetch — arrives at the downstream agent as "data" and is obeyed as "instructions". Each tool call carries PHI across the boundary; a successful exploit discloses it under the attacker's framing, not under a clinician's.
Image-channel injection in clinical-imaging agents
A clinical-imaging agent reads screenshots of EHR UI, DICOM thumbnails, or scanned document images — and the same vision-channel attack families that the dedicated image-input page names (OCR-exfiltration text, embedded instruction overlays, hidden-role images) fire here with the additional cost that the bearer is PHI. The same runtime detector covered on the image-input detection page applies, scored into the same alert_signals pipeline.
Deployment model. Vigil ships as cloud / SaaS today for evaluation and dev environments. Roadmap VPC and BAA-eligible deployment is the next step on the regulated-deployment path so PHI and clinical telemetry stay inside the customer's HIPAA scope from instrumentation through alert retention.
Compliance posture. HIPAA readiness is the headline — a BAA is available with the deployment shift to a customer-controlled boundary, covering agent telemetry, alert retention, and audit-trail access. SOC 2 remains the underlying control framework, and the action_logs + alert_signals tables form the audit trail a covered-entity review or a breach-notification walkthrough can reconstruct from.
Mission systems and public-sector workflows inherit supply-chain exposure the agent runtime cannot outsource.
Government and public-sector agent runtimes plug into procurement systems, case-management workflows, and mission-system data sources that adversaries target because they are high-trust and high-impact. The agent-runtime risks this vertical faces are dominated by supply-chain exposure, multi-agent delegation across departments, and inherited admin privilege. Vigil's run-time pattern scoring maps to each.
Supply-chain risk in agent tool libraries
A compromised dependency — a tampered tool-package, a malicious plug-in pulled from a confused registry, a hijacked update channel — becomes a tool the runtime executes with the calling agent's privileges. The runtime is the only place this can be detected because the dependency is already inside the trust boundary by the time it ships.
Cross-agent delegation in mission-system multi-agent workflows
Low-privilege agents route calls through (or as) higher-privilege peers so the underlying provider sees the higher-trust identity. In inter-departmental multi-agent workflows — a records-retrieval agent calling through a case-management agent, a triage agent invoking through a primary-system agent — this is the confused-deputy shape across organizational boundaries, and it matches the same families tracked on the cross-agent attack surface taxonomy.
Credential exfiltration from inherited admin principals
An agent acting under a delegated admin principal — a privileged service account, an inherited operator role — becomes the channel through which credentials or administrative actions exfiltrate to a downstream system. Detecting it requires naming the principal at tool-call time, and the runtime is the only place the inherited-vs-direct distinction is visible.
Deployment model. Vigil ships as cloud / SaaS today for evaluation and dev environments. Roadmap On-prem / air-gapped and FedRAMP-aligned deployment is the next step for buyers that need full data-plane isolation, with the audit trail and alert pipeline running inside the customer's own boundary.
Compliance posture. FedRAMP is the long-term target — readiness work is in flight against the same SOC 2 controls that anchor the underlying framework today. The action_logs + alert_signals tables form the audit trail, retained on a timeline that an authorizing official or a FedRAMP reviewer can pull against the controls in scope.
Read the technical evidence → Cross-Agent Attack Detection · Prompt Injection Detection